This paper provides estimates of the potential trade effects of an exit of the United Kingdom (UK) from the European Union (EU) on exports and production at the sectoral level as well as GDP in the Netherlands. Owing to the high uncertainty regarding the final trade agreement between the negotiating parties, the choice has been made to assume a worst case outcome where trade relations between the United Kingdom and EU are governed by World Trade Organization (WTO) most favoured nation (MFN) rules. In doing so, it provides an upper bound estimate of the potential negative economic impact stemming from disruptions in trade. Any final trade agreement that would result in closer relationships between the United Kingdom and the EU could reduce this negative impact.
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Introduction and Summary
The United Kingdom's planned departure from the European Union (Brexit) could have major economic consequences for the Netherlands, given strong bilateral trade and investment linkages between the two countries. The UK accounts for 14% of EU real GDP and 10% of EU export demand, a disruption in the UK can thus potentially have a strong impact on other member states. The economic impact will likely be transmitted primarily via the trade channel. The Netherlands is relatively more exposed to a trade shock than other member states as exports account for 50% of Dutch GDP compared to the EU average of 39%.
2 Different sectors of the Dutch economy will be effected to different degrees. The diversity of sectoral impacts will depend on the tariff rates and non-tariff measures the sectors would be subject to, different UK trade exposures of the sectors, different degrees of global value chain integration, and differences in sectors trade diversification opportunities.
In order to assess the potential impact on the Dutch economy, an illustrative scenario is simulated using the OECD METRO model (OECD, 2015) . METRO is an extensive computable general equilibrium (CGE) model. The key advantage of METRO for this analysis is that it provides detailed estimates at the product and sectoral level, accounting for the diversity referred to above. This single framework takes account of the wide variety of factors that will determine the trade impact both at the aggregate and sectoral level.
The importance of this detail can be seen by examining the trade exposure to the UK of broad sectors in the Netherlands (Figure 1 ). The agri-food sector, which accounts for 7% of Dutch production, has a comparatively high UK exposure. This sector accounts for 23% of total exports of the Netherlands to the UK, while the UK market makes up 12% of total Dutch agri-food exports.
3 At the country level three sectors -agri-food, energy and natural resources and chemicals -account for 60% of Dutch exports to the UK. At the sectoral level the UK is an important export market for Dutch sectors, over 10% in three sectors: agri-food, energy and natural resources and electronic equipment. These UK-exposed sectors would be expected to be particularly negatively impacted by the imposition of trade barriers. Since the rules governing the future economic relationship between the United Kingdom and the European Union are highly uncertain, a shock frequently applied in empirical work relating to Brexit (e.g. Kierzenkowski et al., 2016; Bergin et al., 2017; Dhingra et al., 2016; Bellora et al., 2017; Vandenbussche et al., 2017) , supposes that trade relations between the EU and UK default to the World Trade Organisation's (WTO) Most-Favoured Nation (MFN) rules. Relative to current arrangements, this corresponds to an increase in tariff and non-tariff barriers on Dutch trade with the United Kingdom. In this paper, this shock implies a scenario that could be the result of a disorderly conclusion to negotiations and can be considered something close to a worst case outcome. The shock is principally chosen because it can be quantified using existing information on tariffs and non-tariff measures and hence reduces the degree of judgment needed to formulate the shock. Consequently, the results give an upper bound estimate of the size of the negative sectoral economic effects on the Netherlands due to trade disruptions without representing a judgment about the most likely outcome of Brexit negotiations.
5
This paper contributes new insights on the potential impact of Brexit on the Netherlands by providing trade, production and value chain estimates at a highly detailed level, allowing 4 This figure presents broad aggregate sectors. These broad aggregate sectors outlined in Table 17 and are used in this figure and throughout the paper for illustrative purposes. The main results of the METRO simulation are presented using much more disaggregated sectors.
5 In addition to trade disruption the results could also be influenced by longer term factors such as productivity, FDI and innovation not captured in the model. This paper has the advantage that the tariff and NTM profile that is imposed in the WTO scenario is specific to the Netherlands. This is an improvement on some approaches in the existing literature on the impact of Brexit on Netherlands as country specific tariff and NTM profiles can differ substantially from an aggregate EU wide profile (Arriola et al., 2018) .
A further contribution is that the METRO model, through use of the TiVA data, allows the impact on global value chains to be estimated. In TiVA imports are disaggregated by end use category so imports for intermediate use can be specifically modelled. This is of particular importance in the case of Brexit as in addition to the close trading relationship between the Netherland and the United Kingdom the European single market is considered a very deep and broad free trade agreement, which allows for the highest degree of integration of any multi-country trade agreement in existence (Rojas-Romogosa 2016) . This means that the impact from any potential disruption of the import of intermediate inputs could be substantial.
Utilising the METRO model has a particular advantage in the modelling of Brexit as it is a detailed general equilibrium model that allows the simulation of complex trade policy scenarios that may not have a historical precedent.
On the basis of the illustrative shock the main findings include that:
 Dutch exports to the UK would fall by 17% and the country's GDP would decline by 0.7% in the medium term. Sectors with a relatively high exposure to the UK as an export market and whose products would face a comparatively large increase in tariffs would be the most severely affected. The Dutch agri-food sector is estimated to experience a 22% fall in its UK exports. This is driven by a substantial 35% decline in exports in the meat products sector. Smaller manufacturing sectors such as wood and leather products and textiles would see a 20% fall in their UK exports.
 Electronic equipment would see the largest decline in total exports of all non-agrifood sectors at 3% and the largest decline in production at 2.4% in the scenario. The 2% fall in production in agri-food would contribute to a 7% decline in the value of agricultural land. Four of the five sectors that record the largest declines in employment would be in the agri-food sectors.
 Although exports are the key transmission channel there is also an impact from the disruption to global value chains (GVC's). Access to supply chains for intermediate imports from the UK for Dutch sectors would also be curtailed, contributing to an increase in intermediate input costs.
 A few sectors would gain from this Brexit scenario. These include motor vehicles and transport equipment, both of which show increases in exports to the rest of the EU as well as the United States. The gas and financial services sectors would see an increasing in gross exports.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 discusses previous analyses of the impact of the UK exit from the EU on the Dutch economy. Section 3 specifies the shocks used in the analysis. Section 4 provides a description of the METRO model. Section 5 presents the results, and section 6 concludes.
Existing literature on the impact of Brexit on the Netherlands
A number of studies compare the economic impact of Brexit across EU member states and have shown that the Netherlands is one of the most exposed countries. Dhingra et al., (2016) and IMF (2016) have shown that after the UK and Ireland, the Netherlands is the third next most economically affected member state. Using a gravity model at the sector level, Vandenbussche et al. (2017) find that the member states hit the hardest by a WTO Brexit scenario are those with historical ties to the UK, such as Ireland, and small open economies like the Netherlands. They estimate that value added in the Netherlands would be 2.6% lower than base in the scenario, the fourth highest loss in the EU.
Rojas-Ramagosa (2016) estimates a multi-country CGE model for a number of Brexit scenarios. Under a WTO Brexit scenario the Netherlands is the 4 th most impacted country with a GDP decline of 1.2% relative to base and a fall in export volume of 3.2%. This study also estimates sectoral level impacts and finds that the most impacted sectors are electronic equipment, processed foods and motor vehicles. Using a similar methodology, Bellora et al. (2017) estimate the GDP contraction in the Netherlands at 0.5%.
A number of studies use CGE models to rank the impact of Brexit across individual member states. In IMF (2018) a CGE model with monopolistic competition and firm heterogeneity is used to quantify the long-term effects of Brexit. Under a WTO scenario, the Netherlands is the third most impacted country after the UK and Ireland with a GDP loss from base of about 1.0%. Cudrick et al., (2017) estimates a dynamic CGE model and finds that in a WTO scenario the Netherlands is the fourth most impacted country/region behind the UK, Ireland and a Bellux region (Belgium and Luxembourg). The GDP loss is estimated at 0.4% relative to baseline. Felbermayr et al., (2017) estimate a static CGE model and find that the Netherlands is the fifth most impacted economy in the EU with a 0.5% loss in GDP relative to the base.
The focus of the Bellora et al. (2017) study is the agri-food sector. They estimate a 66% fall in Dutch agri-food exports to the UK. Applying a partial equilibrium model Van Berkum et al. (2018) also look specifically at the Dutch agricultural sector. They find that the most negatively affected Dutch exports are beef, butter, milk powder and cheese. As in other studies the overall trade impact is not large, but the impact on individual sector can be sizeable. Under a WTO scenario they estimate the fall in production in the most affected sectors between 2% and 3.3%. This paper is a contribution to this literature as it reports results across a much broader range of indicators and does this at the detailed sectoral level. It also analysis potentially important value global value chain impacts and applies the WTO tariff and NTM schedule specifically to the Netherlands.
Specification of the illustrative Brexit shock for the Netherlands
As in previous OECD analyses ( Kierzenkowski et al., 2016) , the effect of a UK exit from the EU is simulated before the United Kingdom reaches any new trade agreements. For illustrative purposes, trade relations between the United Kingdom and all of its partners, both EU and non-EU, are assumed to be governed by the World Trade Organisation's (WTO) Most-Favoured Nation rules (MFN). Tariffs on goods exported from the United Kingdom are assumed to increase to the importing country's WTO MFN bound rates once the United Kingdom formally exits the European Union. Contemporaneously, the United Kingdom imposes tariffs, equivalent to EU bound rates, on goods imported into the country.
The post-Brexit tariff rates between the United Kingdom and EU member states in the model are set as the MFN bound tariff rates of the European Union in each sector. It is assumed that the United Kingdom will apply the EU MFN bound rates on imports from the rest of the world. This post-Brexit rate is operationalised in the model by applying a markup on the current bilateral applied rate. The mark-up is the percent increase between the applied and the bound rate of the European Union calculated using the WITS-IDB database. Table 13 shows the mark-up applied to the bilateral import rates faced by exporters of goods to the United Kingdom. In a similar fashion, a mark-up is applied on tariff rates faced by UK exports to the rest of the world. This mark-up is based on the percent increase between the applied rates on imports from the UK and the MFN bound rates of regions in the WITS-IDB database. Table 14 shows the mark-up rate applied to a region's current ad valorem tariff rate in the model to simulate the post-Brexit import tariff rates faced by the United Kingdom. In cases where UK imports currently enter duty free, the region's MFN Bound rates are applied.
Once the United Kingdom leaves the customs union, any introduction of administrative rules, like customs declarations, possible border checks, and health or technical compliance reviews, could increase the cost of trade with the remaining EU countries. Moreover, over time, regulatory divergence between the United Kingdom and the European Union could add additional costs to exporters from meeting differing requirements to trade and verifying that requirements are met. These assumed costs would occur on both sides of UK-EU trade and are illustrated by imposing new trade costs related to non-tariff measures (NTMs).
The increase in costs is assumed to be 50% of tariff equivalent estimates of NTMs on goods imported into the EU faced by non-member countries (for more details, see OECD 2018B) and is applied as an iceberg cost (trade costs modelled as an ad valorem tax equivalent but not resulting in any additional revenue) for the simulation.
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The NTM's between the UK and non-EU countries remain unchanged.
Services trade, while not subject to tariffs, is subject to rules, regulations, and other nontariff measures incurring some cost which could increase post-Brexit. The increased cost of services trade between the United Kingdom and the European Union is also simulated as NTM's. Services NTMs are also computed as 50% of the increase in tariff equivalents of NTMs. This is equal to the weighted average of the CEPII import restrictiveness index (Fontagné et al., 2016 ) across all of a country's trading partners.
The model estimates are conservative since it is not assumed that the UK faces changes to NTMs in non-EU countries. Additionally, in case of specific or mixed tariffs, we have no corresponding AVE bound rate, or it is unclear how they are treated in the WTO database. This is specifically the case in agriculture and food as well as steel and chemicals in some 6 The motivation for the 50% rate on the estimated tariffs is further outlined in Kierzenkowski et al., (2018) . Kierzenkowski et al., (2018) state that in Berden et al., (2009) it is estimated that in an optimistic scenario looking at a transatlantic trade deal that a 50% reduction in NTM's could be achieved. This figure is across goods and services (Berden et al., 2009 ). This finding is guiding the assumption made for NTMs facing UK goods and costs on services exports outside the European Union. It is assumed that the tariff equivalents of NTMs on UK-EU trade would rise to 50% of the observed difference of intra-and extra-EU trade in the case when UK trade is governed by the WTO MFN status, cases. Tariff rate quotas (TRQ) are another difficult issue. Where the EU has a TRQ access, it cannot automatically be assumed that the UK after Brexit would inherit a share of the quota. Similarly, where the EU grants preferential access under a TRQ, the UK may lose access to cheap imports. This is, for example, the case of EU sugar imports from African Caribbean and Pacific Countries, (currently UK sugar processing relies heavily on such imports). Overall, it is unclear if or how the EU and the UK would split the current volume of TRQ access. Nor do we know what type of TRQ administration the UK may put in place. The impact on an individual country would be different if the UK granted that country a pre-determined share of the quota so that its exports would not have to compete with exporters from the rest of the world.
Empirical Framework: The METRO model
The METRO model is a computable general equilibrium model (CGE), described in detail in OECD (2015) . For this analysis, the model is aggregated to 10 regions, 40 sectors of the economy, and eight types of factors, with the United Kingdom and the Netherlands disaggregated from the rest of the European Union (EU 26). The simulations represent medium-term shocks where production factors are mobile, but there is no capital accumulation.
CGE models rely on a comprehensive specification of all economic activity within and between countries (and therefore the different inter-linkages that tie these together) and are suitable for examining the impact of a wide range of different trade shocks. The METRO model builds on the GLOBE model developed by McDonald and Thierfelder (2013) . The novelty and strength of the METRO model lies in the detailed trade structure and the differentiation of commodities by end use. Specifically, commodities and thus trade flows are distinguished by whether they are destined for intermediate use, for use by households, for government consumption, or as investment commodities.
The underlying framework of METRO consists of a series of individually specified economies interlinked through trade relationships. As is common in CGE models, the price system in the model is linearly homogeneous, with a focus on relative, not absolute, price changes. Each region has its own numéraire, typically the consumer price index, and a nominal exchange rate (an exchange rate index of reference regions serves as model numéraire). Prices between regions change relative to the reference region.
The database of the model relies on the GTAP v9 database (Aguiar et al., 2016) in combination with the OECD Trade in Value Added data. Policy information combines tariff and tax information from GTAP with OECD estimates of non-tariff measures on goods, trade facilitation and export restricting measures. The dataset contains 61 countries and regional aggregates and 57 commodities.
The model is firmly rooted in microeconomic theory, with firms maximising profits and creating output from primary inputs (i.e. land, natural resources, labour and capital), which are combined using constant elasticity of substitution (CES) technology, and intermediate inputs in fixed shares (Leontief technology). Households are assumed to maximise utility subject to a Stone-Geary utility function, which allows for the inclusion of a subsistence level of consumption. All commodity and activity taxes are expressed as ad valorem tax rates, and taxes are the only income source to the government.
In this study, the government is assumed to maintain its pre-simulation fiscal position by adjusting expenditures as necessary. At the same time, the trade balance is fixed and the nominal exchange rate is flexible in the simulations. Wages are assumed downwardly rigid, but remuneration rates of all other factors (land, capital, natural resources) are assumed to adjust.
Results
As METRO is a trade model the results at the detailed sectoral level for exports, production and value chains are presented first followed by macroeconomic estimates. The sectoral results are presented at two levels of aggregation. Firstly, broad aggregate sectors are presented for illustrative purposes to provide a broad overview of the most exposed and impacted sectors. This level of aggregation is that which is used in Figure 1 and detailed in Table 17 . Secondly, the main results of the METRO simulation for trade, production and factors are presented using much more disaggregated sectors. These detailed sectors are also outlined in Table 17 .
The United Kingdom is an important trading partner accounting for 8% of total Dutch exports and 7% of total imports into the Netherlands (Tables 3 and 4) . From the aggregate perspective the METRO model estimates that the Brexit increase in tariff and non-tariff costs of exporting into the United Kingdom would result in a decline of almost 17% in total Dutch exports to the UK from base levels ( Table 2 ). There is some trade diversion, with exports to all other markets increasing as importers switch from British to Dutch goods and services, but the increases are not enough to cover the loss in the UK market. As result, total Dutch exports decline by 0.8%.
The Dutch meat products, gas and petroleum sectors are the most reliant on UK exports
Certain sectors are potentially more exposed than others to the aggregate decline in trade. Among the broad sectors shown in Figure 1 , agri-food, energy and natural resources, chemicals and electronic equipment are those that are likely the most exposed. The more detailed disaggregation reveals that within the agri-food, energy and natural resources sectors, it is the meat products and the gas sector in particular that are more vulnerable to a UK exit, since exports to the United Kingdom account for 34% and 42% respectively of their total exports (Table 5) . 7 In general, Dutch goods have a relatively higher share of exports going to the United Kingdom than services. On average 15% of goods exports are destined for the UK market compared to just 5% of services trade. On the import side however, services sectors are more exposed to the consequences of Brexit. On average 13% of imports of services comes from the United Kingdom. Dutch imports from the UK in the petroleum sector and business services are particularly high -18% and 15% respectively (Tables 3 and 4) .
Electronic equipment and agri-food sectors would experience the largest fall in exports
Different degrees of UK trade exposure, trade barriers under WTO rules and potential for market diversion, increasing trade to markets other than the UK, among the sectors of the Dutch economy lead to a diverse sectoral reaction to the scenario (Figure 2 ). In the METRO simulation of the WTO scenario, agri-food and motor vehicles would experience the largest fall in their UK exports with an estimated 22% decline. A further four sectors -transport equipment, chemicals, materials manufacturing and metals -would see a 19% -21% reduction in UK exports. The electronic equipment sector has the largest estimated decline in total exports at 3%. This stems from a 16% fall in UK exports.
Changes in total exports in the sectors relative to the fall in their UK exports reveal the impact of UK trade exposure and market diversion on the overall outcome for a sector.
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The agri-food and motor vehicles sectors are estimated to experience the same fall in their UK exports, but while the overall exports of the motor vehicles sector increase by 1.3%, for agri-food exports fall by 2.5%. This outcome for the vehicles sector is different from that found by Rojas-Ramagosa (2016) who estimates a relatively large overall decline in this sector. This is possibly due to a difference in the modelling of the trade diversion to that in this paper; this is discussed in Box 1.
Box 1. Trade Elasticities and scenario outcomes: The Dutch motor vehicles sector
In the WTO scenario, exports of the Dutch motor vehicles sector increase by 1.3%. This sector's output expands in a scenario with increases in tariff and non-tariff barriers due 8 Market diversion is a function of product level elasticity parameters with enter the first order conditions for export and import volumes. to trade diversion: the demand for the outputs of this sector by the UK's trading partners is diverted to other countries and the Netherlands benefits from this effect.
The size of this outcome can be influenced by trade elasticity assumptions. For illustrative proposes the scenario is run with the export supply elasticity increased by a factor of five. This flattens the export supply curve across all countries making them more responsive to price movements. With the lower elasticity countries did not change outputs as much and thus to satisfy demand in response to a trade disruption with the UK countries predominant response was to increase imports along existing patterns of trade. With a higher elasticity the demand can be satisfied from a broader range of countries as they respond more to the price movement. With a higher elasticity Dutch exports are reduced and more of the diverted demand formerly met by the UK is now met by China, India, the United States and Canada (Figure 3 ).
The export supply elasticity values used in this paper as seen as more reflective or real world dynamics in the response of country's exports and production to price changes. The results shown in Figure 2 are for broad sectors (as shown in Figure 1 and detailed in Table 17 ). It is of interest to compare further the differing reaction of the agri-food and energy and natural resources sectors. The position of the two sectors in Figure 1 suggests that both have a similar exposure to a UK exit. There is however a considerable difference in the impact of a WTO scenario on these sectors (Figure 2 ). In terms of both the decline in exports to the UK and total exports, the reduction experienced by the energy and natural resources sectors is less than half that seen in agri-food. As will be discusses subsequently this is to an increase in exports to other markets that is not seen in agri-food.
The fall in agri-food exports is driven by the meat sector
The more detailed level of sectoral aggregation reveals that the agri-food result is driven by a sharp fall in exports of the meat products sector to the UK (Table 5 ). This sector's UK exports would fall by 35% and its total exports by 13% in this scenario. This reduction in total exports is over four times the fall recorded in any other sector. Other sectors that experience a large contraction are other processed foods, electronic equipment, vegetables and fruits, wearing apparel, leather products and wood products. These sectors would see a 2-3% fall in total exports. The largest estimated fall in UK exports is 38% in the wearing apparel sector. This sector is a component of the broader materials manufacturing sector; in this sector there are also above 20% declines in exports of wood products, leather products and textiles to the UK. Two components of the metals sector (metal products and metals nec) see above 20% declines in their UK exports. In total 12 Dutch sectors experience a fall in UK exports exceeding 20%. The important gas and horticulture sectors would experience comparatively smaller 12% and 9% reductions in their UK exports, respectively.
Sectors which would experience an increase in exports under the WTO scenario are those that see a strong market diversion effect. The motor vehicles, transport equipment and financial services sectors see above 2% increases in their exports to the EU 26 countries. The gas sector is substantial in the Netherlands and in the scenario its exports increase by 0.6%. This is partially due to a strong market diversion effect, as the sector's exports to the EU and US increase by 6% and 10% respectively.
The Netherlands has a comparative specialisation in agri-food and horticulture
Turning from trade to production, services and the public sector are the largest sectors accounting for 17% and 16% respectively of Dutch output (Table 6 ). The agri-food sectors combined account for 7% of production, above the EU average for this sector. Horticulture accounts for a share of output that is five times larger in the Dutch economy than the EU average, reflecting specialisation in this sector. Overall, Dutch horticulture accounts for 15% of total EU production in this sector. There is also a specialisation in petroleum and gas with this sector accounting for a 14 times greater share of production in comparison to the EU average. The gas sector in the Netherlands accounts for 67% of the EU wide gas sector and 26% of all EU gas manufacture and distribution.
The agri-food and electronic equipment sector would see the largest falls in production
There is a large disparity in the estimated production declines. For illustrative purposes the decline in the broad sectors is shown in Figure 4 with electronic equipment and agri-food estimated to have the largest declines. 9 At the more detailed level, four of the five sectors that experience the largest falls in production are agri-food sectors (Table 7) . The largest impact is in the meat products sector where there would be a 9.1% fall in production relative to base, three times larger than the fall in the next most impacted sector. The agriculture, vegetables and fruits and processed foods sectors record production falls of 2% and above. The specialised horticulture sector would experience a 1.2% decline in production. These agri-food production falls are larger than the average fall in the other EU member states.
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In addition to agri-food, another particularly impacted sector is electronic equipment with an estimated 2.4% fall in production from the 3% decline in its total exports. The gas sector would experience no fall in production, while in gas manufacture and distribution output falls by just 0.4% in the scenario. As in the case of Ireland, some smaller manufacturing sectors -textiles, wearing apparel, wood and paper products -are among the most negatively affected sectors (Arriola et al., 2018) . These sectors see their production contract THE POTENTIAL ECONOMIC IMPACT OF BREXIT ON THE NETHERLANDS Unclassified by at least 1% relative to base. Two sectors -motor vehicles and transport equipmentexperience an increase in production in the scenario due to trade diversion. 
Brexit would lead to a substantial decline in the value of agricultural land in the Netherlands
The METRO model captures the impact of scenarios on the supply and demand for each production factor: land, labour and capital (Table 10) .
11 The trade disruption caused by Brexit would lead to production declines across industries and thus declines in factors demanded. The production impact on the agri-food sector is reflected in the declines in factor income. There would be a 7.3% fall in the value of agricultural land; a factor of production that is demanded exclusively by the agri-food sectors (Table 8 ). The decline in the value of agricultural land is substantial; it is more than double the average land value decline in the rest of the EU. This further highlights the relatively high trade exposure of the agri-food sector in the Netherlands to Brexit.
Unemployment rises strongest among low-skilled workers in the agri-food sectors
Total factor demand for labour can be thought of as the overall wage bill (number of workers multiplied by average wage). In the model wages are assumed to be downwardly rigid, so that changes in labour factor incomes are reflective of changes in employment. Employment declines for each category of worker would range from 0.9 to 1.5%, with office managers and professionals seeing the largest reductions. This category makes up the majority of workers in the Netherlands at 43% of the labour force (Table 9 and 11). The overall reduction in labour factor demand is estimated at 1.3%. 11 In the scenario the supply of land and physical capital are fixed. At the sectoral level the declines in labour demand match the production declines with a 9.8% fall in demand for labour in the meat sector and 1 -3% declines in the other agrifood sectors in the scenario (Table 10) . Again matching production, four of the five sectors that record the largest declines in employment are in the agri-food sectors. Initial factor demands show the relative capital and labour intensities in each sector (Table 11 ). These figures show that the agri-food sectors are, along with public administration, the most labour intensive sectors in the Dutch economy.
Other sectors that record above 2% falls in employment are smaller manufacturing sectors and the electronic equipment sector. The gas and horticulture sectors would see falls of 0.7% and 1.7% in employment respectively. In the meat products sector the fall in employment is most concentrated among agricultural and other low skilled workers. These workers account for 31% of the fall in employment in this sector. Due to their size it is however the service sectors that experience the greatest absolute fall in labour demand across all sectors.
In terms of capital input, the meat products sector would see the largest decline in capital with an 8.7% fall. This sector does however only account for a small fraction of the total capital stock in the Dutch economy. Business services have the largest share at 22%. In the scenario this sector expands its capital stock as capital becomes cheaper.
Brexit impairs the participation of the Netherlands in Global value chains
In addition to gross trade flows, the participation of the Netherlands in global value chains is likely to be affected by Brexit. This is an important consideration as participation in GVCs allows higher levels of specialisation, productivity growth and thus job creation (OECD 2017).
There is a wide disparity in the use of imported intermediate inputs across sectors in the Netherlands ( Figure 5 ). 16% of the total value of production in the Dutch business services sector is accounted for by imported intermediate inputs with the remainder being value added and domestic sourcing. This is the highest percentage of any sector; the lowest is in electricity and water at 1.4%. These figures suggest the disruption from this channel would not be of the same magnitude as that from the export channel.
In the WTO scenario, higher trade barriers on sourcing from the UK leads to a fall in UK intermediate input use. The largest fall in intermediate imports from the UK is estimated to be in the motor vehicles sector with a 57% reduction. The second largest fall in imports is in financial and insurance sector at 46%, this sector is however less reliant on intermediates in production compared to other sectors. Overall, all sectors except gas manufacture would see a reduction in their intermediate imports from the UK. This is an indication that in the scenario the connection of the sectors of the Dutch economy to supply chains is disrupted. The overall effect is an increase in intermediate input costs in the Netherlands. At the macroeconomic level the trade reliant Dutch economy is relatively more exposed to Brexit
Due to the strong trade and financial linkages between the Netherlands and the UK the scenario would have sizable macroeconomic consequences for the Netherlands (Table 1) . The macroeconomic effects presented come from the trade channel. Other channels may influence the macroeconomic outcome such as the relocation of FDI or productivity effects, these are not captured in the model. 13 Over the medium-term Dutch real exports fall by 0.8% relative to baseline, this fall in export activity reduces domestic demand within the Netherlands. The overall impact is a medium-term 0.7% reduction in real GDP relative to baseline.
These macroeconomic impacts of a WTO scenario are lower than those in the existing literature. Rojas-Romagosa (2016) uses a dynamic CGE model, as opposed to the static model used in this estimation, and assumes a much higher level of non-tariff barriers in a WTO scenario than are assumed in this paper. Erken et al., (2017) employ a different modelling approach, the NiGEM global macroeconometric model. In addition to a different modelling structure, it incorporates productivity and capital accumulation channels which may account for a stronger macroeconomic impact in that analysis. 13 See Paczos (2018) for a discussion of channels captured by different trade modelling approaches. 
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Imported intermediate inputs as a per cent of total production
Among the four use categories, exports for private consumption take the largest hit ( Despite the 14% decline in exports to the United Kingdom, capital goods exports increase by 0.4% in the Netherlands under the simulated UK Brexit. Exports increase to all other partners, notably the EU which account for more than half of capital goods exported at the base. Exports of machinery and equipment, which make up 42% of Dutch exports for capital use, increase towards all destinations by between 1 and 2%.
Conclusions
As an open economy with strong trade links to the United Kingdom, the Netherlands is very exposed to any increase in trade barriers between the United Kingdom and the EU. This paper considers an illustrative shock in which trade relations between the EU and the United Kingdom default to operating along WTO MFN rules. This paper employs the extensive and detailed METRO trade model to quantify the trade impact of a WTO scenario on the economy of the Netherlands both at the sectoral and macroeconomic level.
The paper adds considerably to the existing literature on the economic impact of Brexit on the Netherlands as it reports estimates for the effect of a WTO scenario on exports, imports, production, value chains and factor demand at the sectoral level. Estimates for the Netherlands in much of the existing Brexit literature are restricted to broad aggregates such as GDP. The paper applies the scenarios tariff and NTM increases at the country level. This captures important variation from an alternative application of EU wide tariffs. A further contribution is that the use of the TiVA data in the METRO model allows an examination of the impact on global value chains, specifically the impact on imported intermediate inputs. This is of importance due to the unique nature of the integration in the single market and so the potential for production chain disruption.
The METRO simulation suggests that there would be a sharp reduction of 17% in Dutch exports to the United Kingdom in the WTO scenario. There is considerable variation in the impact across the different sectors of the Dutch economy. The agri-food, smaller manufacturing, and electronic equipment sectors would be the most severely affected. Exports from the agri-food sector to the UK would fall by 22%. This is driven by a 35% decline in the exports of the meat products sector. Exports of the smaller manufacturing sectors to the UK are estimated to fall by over 20% and those of electronic equipment by 18%. These sectors are particularly negatively affected due to the concentration of their exports into the United Kingdom market and the comparatively high tariffs their products would face under a WTO schedule.
Not all sectors are negatively impacted, with a number of sectors experiencing a slight increase in total exports. Notably the important gas sector sees an increase in total exports, as do motor vehicles, transport equipment and a number of service sectors such as financial, insurance and business services. This is due to trade diversion effects and is mainly concentrated in the EU markets.
Brexit also disrupts the access of Dutch sectors to global supply chains. Access to intermediate inputs from the UK is curtailed and falls across most sectors. The motor
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vehicles sector is estimated to be the most affected and sees a 57% reduction in intermediate imports from the UK. There is also a large fall for financial services.
The trade model used also shows how the fall in export demand could affect production in different sectors in the scenario. The highly UK-exposed electronic equipment sector would see a 3% fall in output. The 2% fall in output in the agri-food sector leads to a 7% decline in the value of agricultural land. The largest proportional employment reductions would also be concentrated in the agri-food sectors.
OECD (2011) 
Simulation Tariff Rates
It is assumed that once the United Kingdom formally leaves the customs union, imports of UK good into the European Union would face the region's MFN rates (Table 12) . Imports into the United Kingdom from the Netherlands and the remaining 26 EU member states would face the same MFN rates. Moreover since the effects of a UK exit are simulated before any new trade agreements are reached, it is assumed that UK exporters would face MFN treatment in all other markets in the simulation scenario, and the UK would, in turn, apply the EU's MFN rates on goods from non-member countries.
The MFN bilateral bound rates between the United Kingdom and non-EU member countries, for the simulation, are applied as a mark-up on the current applied rates in the model database. The mark-up is based on the WTO information in the WITS-IDB database, and is computed to increase the applied rate in the database by the same amount as in the WITS-IDB. It is calculated as one plus the percent increase between the effectively applied tariff rate and the MFN bound rate and is computed for each sector and for each trading partner. The new tariff rate applied by the United Kingdom on goods imported from non EU member countries is computed as the applied rate in the database multiplied by the markup rate between the effectively applied rate and MFN bound rates of the European Union (Table 13) . If goods from a sector and trading partner enter the European Union duty free, then new tariff rate applied is the EU's MFN bound rate for that sector and partner. The simulation tariff rate applied on UK exports by non-EU countries is computed and applied in a similar fashion. A markup rate, based on the percent increase between the effectively applied and MFN bound rate for each UK trading partner, is applied to the import tariff rate faced by the United Kingdom in foreign markets (Table 14) . If goods from the United Kingdom enter duty free in the base situation, the MFN bound rate of the region is used as the simulation tariff rate. Source: Author's calculation based on the WITS-IDB database. Based on the 2016 tariff rates for the EU 28. The markup rate is calculated as one plus the percent increase between the effectively applied rate and MFN bound rates of the European Union in each sector and for each partner. The markup rate is multiplied with the current bilateral applied rate in the model database to simulate the post-BREXIT tariff rate. To calculate markup in WITS-IDB if the effectively applied rate is 0, then a small applied rate is used (0.1%) to calculate the markup. The markup rate is one plus the percent increase between the effectively applied rate applied to UK imports and MFN bound rates of the importing country. The markup rate is multiplied with the current bilateral applied rate in the model database to simulate the post-BREXIT tariff rate. To calculate mark-up in WITS-IDB if the effectively applied rate is 0, then a small applied rate is used (0.1%) to calculate the markup.
Increase cost of non-tariff measures (NTMs)
Once the UK leaves the customs union, introduction of administrative rules like customs declaration, border checks, and health or technical compliance reviews would increase the cost of trade between the UK and the remaining EU countries. Moreover as the two regions are no longer bound to maintaining the same rules, regulatory divergence would add additional cost to exporters in not only meeting differing requirements to trade but also verifying that requirements are met. These cost would occur on both sides of the UK-EU border and would apply to both goods and services trade. Goods and services being exported from the UK would be treated as coming from any other non-EU member state. EU and Dutch exporters would be required to comply to UK regulations to gain access to its market. These increase costs on both the trade of goods and services are captured by imposing non-tariff measures (NTMs) on goods and services. The increase in NTM costs is applied as an iceberg cost for the simulation.
The per cent changes in the NTMs on exports from the service sector are computed as 50% of the increase in tariff equivalents of NTMs faced by the exporter once trade between the United Kingdom and EU member states is governed by MFN status (Table 15 ). The tariff equivalents of services NTMs is equal to the weighted average of the CEPII import restrictiveness index across all of a country's trading partners. The NTMs faced by exporters under MFN rules, is the weighted average of the index where EU countries or the UK, depending on the exporter, is at the same level as of the rest of world.
NTMs in the goods sector are based on a new set of tariff equivalent rates estimated by the OECD (2018B). Ad Valorem Equivalents based on a price-based estimated are derived for roughly 5 000 products on a bilateral basis and explicitly distinguish between several types of measures. Types of NTMs on goods trade are included in the analysis: Tariff equivalents on SPS measures, which are largely limited to the agriculture sector; and Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT) measures, which are more uniformly used across sectors with peaks in textiles, processed foods, and chemicals. Trade weighted averages of the NTM cost faced by a non-EU country when exporting into the EU are computed for the two types of NTMs at the sector level. The sum of the two types of NTMs is assumed to be the total NTM costs. The increase in non-tariff related costs, post-Brexit, of trading goods between the United Kingdom and the European Union is assumed to be 50% of sum of the two types NTMs (Table 16 ). Source: OECD (2018B). 
